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1. INTRODUCTION
In the early 1980s, attention focused on the possibility
that PTS events could challenge the integrity of the RPV
because operational experience suggested that overcooling
events, while not common, did occur, and because the
results of in-reactor materials surveillance programs showed
that US RPV steels and welds, particularly those having
high copper content, experience a loss of toughness with
time due to neutron irradiation embrittlement. These rec-
ognitions motivated analysis of PTS and the development
of toughness limits for safe operation. It is now widely
recognized that state of knowledge and data limitations
from this time necessitated conservative treatment of several
key parameters and models used in the probabilistic cal-
culations that provided the technical basis [1] of the PTS
Rule [2]. To remove the unnecessary burden imposed by
these conservatisms, and to improve the staff’s efficiency
in processing exemption and license exemption requests,
the NRC undertook the PTS re-evaluation project [3,4].  
The PTS re-evaluation project was conducted between
1998 and 2009 by the United States Nuclear Regulatory
Commission USNRC. Assistance and data was provided
by the commercial nuclear power industry operating under
the auspices of the Electric Power Research Institute
(Electric Power Research Institute). Toward the end of this
time the project findings were reviewed by the Advisory
Committee on Reactor Safeguards (ACRS), the Nuclear
Energy Institute (NEI), the public, and a panel of national
and international experts. These reviews provided the basis
for numerous model corrections and improvements. Based
on the findings of this project, the NRC initiated rulemaking
on a voluntary alternate to 10 CFR 50.61 in 2006 [5,6].
Rulemaking was completed on January 4, 2010 when 10
CFR 50.61a was published in the Federal Register [7].  
This description of the PTS re-evaluation project begins
in Section 2 with a discussion of the risk limits that provide
the basis for the embrittlement-based screening limits
adopted in 10 CFR 50.61a. Then Section 3 describes the
probabilistic model that was used to develop relationships
between risk limits and embrittlement limits. Section 4
describes the results obtained from this model, and Section
5 describes how they were used to establish regulatory limits
for 10 CFR 50.61a. Section 6 compares the regulatory
provisions of 10 CFR 50.61 and to 10 CFR 50.61a.
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2. REGULATORY LIMITS
In the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, which allowed the
first large scale commercial use of nuclear energy in the
United States, the United States Congress instructed the
Atomic Energy Commission (AEC, the precursor to the
NRC) to “provide adequate protection to the health and
safety of the public” from radiological hazards. In the years
that followed some studies attempted to define quantita-
tively the level of risk that nuclear generation of electricity
posed to the public, and to provide some rationalization
regarding what risk levels could be regarded as acceptable
[8,9]. Nevertheless, between 1954 and the late 1980s the
methods used by the AEC, and later by the NRC, to ensure
the “adequate protection” required by their legislative man-
date were, by and large, those common to “deterministic”
engineering analysis, i.e. bounding approaches, margins,
and the use of the defense-in-depth principle. This situation
began to change in the early 1980s. Motivated by the rec-
ommendations of the President’s Commission on the Acci-
dent at Three Mile Island [10], and enabled by improve-
ments in computational technology and PRA methodologies,
the NRC pursued much more vigorously the formal defi-
nition of both qualitative and quantitative safety objectives,
or “safety goals.” It should also be added that having clearly
articulated safety goals, along with accepted methods by
which the performance of plants (or fleets of plants) relative
to these goals can be measured, removes arbitrariness from,
increases the transparency of, and improves the uniformity
of the regulatory decision-making process.
The work on safety goals begun after the Three Mile
Island accident culminated in the issuance of a safety goal
policy statement in 1986 [11]. This statement, along with
other policies that lead the way to the risk limits adopted
in the PTS re-evaluation project, are illustrated in Fig. 1.
Key points that link the PTS risk limits to Commission
policy may be summarized as follows. The 1986 safety goal
policy statement defines risk limits for plant operation in
terms of quantitative health objectives (QHOs) that measure
the prompt fatality risk to individuals, and the latent cancer
fatality risk to society [11]. The QHOs for both limit the
health and safety risk arising from nuclear plant operations
to a very small fraction (< 0.1%) of the total public risk.
In 2000, the 1986 policy statement was modified to include
a subsidiary limit on the core damage frequency (CDF) of
1x10-4/ry, and was clarified by stating that both the CDF
and QHO limits were intended to guide generic agency
decisions (e.g., rulemaking) [12]. The information in both
policy statements was incorporated into, and augmented
by, the publication of Regulatory Guide 1.154 [13]. This
guide provided yet another subsidiary goal, the large early
release frequency (LERF). RG1.154 also defined limits on
the total CDF and LERF, as well as on the CDF and LERF
seen to arise from any single cause (see the table in Fig. 1).
Finally, this ∆LERF limit of 10-6/ry was used in the PTS
re-evaluation project to establish a limit on the through-wall
cracking frequency (TWCF) of 10-6 events per reactor
operating year. The TWCF limit is based on a conservatively
assumed equivalence between TWCF and LERF [3].    
Beyond the considerations that led to the 10-6 limit,
the staff also considered the definition of vessel “failure.”
Failure was defined as the initiation of a rapidly propaga-
ting fracture from a pre-existing flaw in the vessel beltline
region, followed by sufficient extension of that flaw to
penetrate fully the thickness of the RPV wall. This definition
was adopted because through-wall cracking of the RPV
was viewed as a measure closely related to the potentially
significant public health consequences that are discussed
in Commission policy guidance. An assessment of the
sequence of events between vessel “failure” and either
core damage or LERF revealed that LERF is an unlikely
consequence of through-wall cracking in the overwhelming
majority of scenarios, thereby validating the conservatism
of assuming that LERF=TWCF for the purpose of associ-
ating reference temperature based screening metrics with
a numeric risk limit.
3. TECHNICAL MODEL / METHODOLOGY
3.1 Overview
Fig. 2 illustrates our overall model of PTS, which
involves three major components:
1. Probabilistic Evaluation of Through-Wall Cracking
Frequency: Estimates the frequency of through-
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Fig. 1. Origins of Risks Limits for Nuclear Power Plant
Operation in the USA.  
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wall cracking due to a PTS event.
2. Acceptance Criterion for Through-Wall Cracking
Frequency: Establishes a value of reactor vessel
failure frequency based on NRC guidance on risk-
informed decision-making.
3. Screening Limit Development: Compares the results
of the two preceding steps to determine if a materia
property-based PTS screening limit can be established.
Component 2 was described in Section 2 while Com-
ponent 3 will be described in Section 5. The information
provided in this section describes the approach taken to
estimate the TWCF (Component 1).  
As illustrated in Fig. 2, three main models (shown as
solid blue squares) permit estimation of the annual fre-
quency of through-wall cracking in an RPV. First, a PRA
(probabilistic risk assessment) event sequence analysis
(see Section 3.2) defines the sequences of events that may
cause a PTS challenge to RPV integrity, and estimate the
frequency of their occurrence.  The event sequence defini-
tions are passed to a TH (thermal hydraulic) analysis (see
Section 3.3), which estimates the temporal variation of
temperature, pressure, and heat-transfer coefficient in the
RPV downcomer characteristic of each sequence. These
time histories are used along with other information by a
PFM (probabilistic fracture mechanics) analysis (see
Section 3.4) to estimate the driving force to fracture for a
particular event sequence, which is compared to the fracture
toughness of the RPV steel to estimate the probability of
a crack penetrating all the way through the RPV wall. Fi-
nally, a matrix multiplication of the probability of through-
wall cracking with the frequency of the event sequence
permits estimation of the annual frequency of through-wall
cracking for a particular plant over a particular operational
period. Performance of such analyses for various operating
lifetimes estimates how the annual TWCF increases with
increasing embrittlement.  
Detailed analyses were performed for three operating
PWRs: Oconee Unit 1, Beaver Valley Unit 1, and Palisades
to sample a range of design and construction methods.
Since this study aimed to develop PTS screening limits
applicable to all PWRs in the USA, we needed to under-
stand the extent to which these analyses cover the range of
conditions experienced by US PWRs in general. To achieve
this goal, we performed sensitivity studies on the TH and
PFM models to determine the effect, if any, of credible
changes to the models and/or their input parameters on the
calculated results. Also, we examined plant design and
operational characteristics of five additional plants to de-
termine whether the features identified as being important
to our three detailed analyses also characterize the fleet.
Finally, in our three detailed analyses we assumed that the
only possible origins of PTS events are caused by events
internal to the plant. However external events (e.g., fires,
floods, and earthquakes) may also be PTS precursors. We
therefore examined the potential for external events to
produce significant additional risk.
3.2 Probabilistic Risk Assessment and Human
Reliability Analysis 
3.2.1 Identification and Modeling of Event Sequences
(Binning)
The format, structure, and details considered in the
current analyses draw considerably from the earlier PRA
analyses of PTS [14-17]. In addition to recognition of the
results and the reasons for the results from these past anal-
yses, limitations and conservatism associated with the past
studies were identified and, to the greatest possible extent,
alleviated. Other improvements were adopted with the intent
of increasing both the accuracy and comprehensiveness of
the PRA representations of the plants. Table 1 summarizes
the differences between the current PRA and that used to
support the 10 CFR 50.61. Since these improvements were
made with the intent of increasing both the accuracy and
comprehensiveness of the PRA representations of the plants,
they neither systematically increase nor reduce the estimated
risk from PTS.
Review of past PRA analyses of PTS provided infor-
mation on the following four areas:
Identifying the types of sequences that needed to
be included in the PRA: These sequences included
overcooling scenarios at both full-power operation and
under hot-shutdown (HZP) conditions, loss of RCS
pressure scenarios, late repressurization scenarios, and
scenarios that provide immediate overcooling, as well
as those that begin as loss-of-cooling scenarios (i.e.,
undercooling) and subsequently become overcooling
scenarios.
Identifying what types of initiating events needed
to be included: These events included small-, medium-,
and large-break LOCAs, reactor-turbine trip, loss of
main feedwater, loss of main condenser, loss of offsite
power (including station blackout), loss of support
systems (such as AC or DC buses), loss of instrument
air, loss of various cooling water systems, steam gen-
Fig. 2. Schematic Showing how an Estimate of TWCF is
Combined with a TWCF Acceptance Criterion to Establish a
PTS Screening Limit.
erator tube rupture (SGTR), and small and large steam
line breaks with and without subsequent isolation.
Identifying what functions and equipment status
needed to be included: The event trees in the PRA
models that depict potential overcooling sequences are
based on the status and interactions of four plant func-
tions (i.e., primary integrity, secondary pressure, sec-
ondary feed, and primary flow/ pressure) and associated
plant equipment. In the plant event trees, the status of
equipment relevant to each function is modeled in each
PRA.
Identifying what human actions needed to be con-
sidered: The process to identify, model, and probabil-
istically quantify human factors derives largely from
NUREG-1624, Revision 1 [18], which uses an expert
elicitation approach. In this study, the experts considered
both errors of omission and acts of commission. This
process identified several general classes of human
failures (see Table 2), which have been incorporated
into the PRA models.
The event tree-fault tree PRA methodology was used
[19]. The modeling approach varied somewhat from plant-
to-plant because of the order in which the plants were ana-
lyzed. Lessons learned in the Oconee analysis impacted
the Beaver Valley and Palisades modeling approach, for
example. Additionally, the availability of information from
TH and PFM at the time PRA modeling was performed
influenced how the PRA model evolved. For Oconee, initial
bins were constructed by developing event tree partitioning
rules in SAPHIRE, and then applying those rules to produce
the TH bins. Development of the partitioning rules required
the analysts to examine the TH information available from
preliminary analyses to identify the characteristics that
would be important to the binning process. Using this in-
formation, the analysts then made judgments as to whether
existing TH characteristics could be used to represent new
groups of sequences. If the analysts judged that existing
characteristics were appropriate (i.e., matched or were more
severe than the sequence considered), the uniquely defining
characteristics associated with the existing TH analyses
were written in rule form for application in SAPHIRE. For
those cases where the analysts were sufficiently unsure
as to the appropriateness of using existing characteristics
the TH analysis being considered formed the basis for a
new bin. This iterative process continued until all accident
sequence cut sets were associated with a specific TH bin.
Once all cut sets were gathered into the initial TH bins, the
bins were re-quantified using a truncation limit of 10-10/yr.
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Table 1. Comparison of PRA Analyses used in this Study with the PRA Analyses that Supported 10 CFR 50.61
Difference Between Current PRA Analyses and the PRA Analyses that Supported 10 CFR 50.61 Effect on Risk
&
Slight expansion of the types of sequences and initiators considered (e.g. HZP, medium – large
diameter primary pipe breaks)
Slight expansion of support systems both as initiators and as dependencies affecting equipment response
Less gross binning of TH sequences
External initiating events considered as potential PTS precursors
A greater number of discrete operator action times are considered.
Includes the latest industry-wide (and some plant-specific) data for initiating event frequencies,
equipment failure probabilities, and common-cause considerations.  
Credit for operator actions is based on detailed consideration of numerous factors associated with the
modeled sequences, on simulator observations, on the latest procedures and relevant training, and on
numerous discussions with operating and training staffs.  Detrimental acts of commission are also
considered.
Refinement
of Detail
Considered
by the
Analysis
Treatment
of Operator
Actions
Use of New
Data
Table 2. General Classes of Human Failures Considered in the PTS Analyses
Primary Integrity Control Secondary Pressure Control Secondary Feed Control Primary Pressure/Flow Control
Operator fails to isolate an
isolable LOCA in a timely
manner
Operator fails to isolate a
depressurization condition in a
timely manner
Operator isolates when not
needed 
Operator isolates wrong path/SG
Operator creates an excess steam
demand
Operator fails to stop/throttle or
properly align feed in a timely
manner
Operator feeds wrong (i.e.,
affected) SG
Operator stops/throttles feed
when inappropriate 
Operator does not properly
control cooling and
throttle/terminate injection to
control RCS pressure
Operator trips RCPs when not
appropriate and/or fails to
restore them when desirable
Operator does not provide
sufficient injection or fails to
trip RCPs appropriately
Operator induces a LOCA that
induces/enhances a cooldown
For Beaver Valley and for Palisades essentially the same
process was followed except that knowledge about what
was not important in the Oconee analysis was used to limit
the detail needed in the models.
With preliminary results available, reviews were con-
ducted to determine whether inaccuracies existed in the
models, whether additional potential PTS sequences needed
to be modeled, whether additional TH bins should be created
to reduce unnecessary conservatism, which human actions
were associated with the important TH bins, and which
of those human actions should be reexamined to produce
even more realistic HEPs.
3.2.2 Uncertainty Quantification
The PRA analysis estimates frequencies of the set of
representative plant responses to plant upsets (i.e., scenarios).
The major area of uncertainty associated with these fre-
quencies depends on the following factors:
Modeling of the representative plant scenarios: Each
scenario in the PRA is represented by a collection of
events described by the logic of the event tree and
relevant fault trees for each initiating event identified
in the analysis. The model initially assumed binary
logic for the events. The only explicit modeling of
event timing involved the timing of operator actions.
Most uncertainties with regard to model structure were
not quantified. However, where deemed potentially
important, a few aleatory uncertainties were addressed
by purposely changing the model and assigning a
probability to the applicability of the model change.
Each of these changes became a different scenario with
an associated frequency. Since it is unknown which
scenario will occur following an initiating event, the
complete set of scenarios, as represented by the event
trees, characterize a large part of the aleatory uncer-
tainty associated with the occurrence of a PTS challenge.
Estimation of the frequency of each modeled sce-
nario: Each scenario from the set of modeled scenarios
is the interaction of what are treated as random events:
an initiating event (plant upset), a series of mitigating
equipment successes/failures, and operator action. Thus,
the occurrence of each scenario is random, and the
frequency of each scenario is obtained using the follow-
ing equation:
where f denotes a frequency and Py denotes a probability.
Each of the variables used to obtain the scenario frequency
has an epistemic uncertainty described by a distribution.
Latin Hypercube sampling techniques were used to propa-
gate these epistemic uncertainties.  
3.3 Thermal Hydraulic Analysis 
A TH analysis requires calculation of conservation of
mass and energy, from which pressure and temperature
follow from the equation of state. From this information,
the analysis estimates the distribution of energy within
the reactor coolant system. Within the downcomer, the
interface between the thermal-hydraulic and fracture me-
chanics calculations is the heat flux between the downcomer
fluid and the vessel wall. Heat flux quantifies the RCS
energy distribution, which depends on both the temperature
and heat transfer characteristics of the downcomer region.
In this study, we used RELAP5/MOD3.2.2γ to estimate the
heat flux and pressure boundary conditions [20]. RELAP5
is a best-estimate systems code that models heat transfer
and hydrodynamic processes without any intentional
conservative or nonconservative modeling features. Our
experimental validation of RELAP5 addressed its ability
to accurately estimate pressure, downcomer fluid temper-
ature, and wall-to-fluid heat transfer coefficients for PTS
loading conditions [21].  
3.3.1 Fundamental Assumptions
Two assumptions underlie our use of RELAP5: the
assumption that the conditions in the downcomer are “well
mixed” (meaning there are no significant thermal plumes),
and the assumption that a single TH transient can be used
to represent the conditions of an entire PRA bin to the PFM
analysis. The appropriateness of these assumptions is
assessed in this section.
• Plumes: We have compared the predictions of RELAP5
to the results of integral systems and separate effects
tests to establish the adequacy of the assumption of a
one-dimensional (1D) temperature boundary condition.
These comparisons included examination of experiments
conducted at the APEX-CE test facility at Oregon State
University to study cold leg and downcomer mixing,
at the Loss-of-Fluid Test (LOFT) facility and the Rig
of Safety Assessment (ROSA), at the Upper Plenum
Test Facility (UPTF), at Creare, at Purdue University,
and at Imatron Voimy Oy in Finland [22,23]. The
experimental data consistently confirm that the down-
comer is well-mixed for the PTS transients of interest
in US PWRs. In integral system test data, the temper-
ature variations seen in the in the axial or azimuthal
directions are on the order of 9ºF (5ºC). Large temper-
ature gradients (i.e., on the order of 180ºF, or 100ºC)
are often seen in the cold leg following loop flow stag-
nation. However, temperature gradients in the cold leg
do not translate to temperature gradients in the down-
comer because of the large eddy mixing occurring in
the downcomer. Also, a sensitivity study on the effect
of plumes showed no increase on the TWCF even when
plumes 12 times stronger than those observed exper-
imentally were modeled.
• Binned Representation of PTS Challenge: We employed
an iterative process to establish the single TH transient
used to represent an entire PRA bin (which may contain
many tens or hundreds of transients). This process
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(Eq. 1)
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features partitioning of the PRA bins that contribute
significantly to the estimated TWCF until the total
estimated TWCF for the plant does not change signifi-
cantly with continued partitioning. Given that process,
the appropriateness of using a single TH tran-sient to
represent an entire bin is not justified based on the exact
agreement of the representative TH transient to all of
the other transients in the bin (which is not, and cannot,
be guaranteed). Rather, the appropriateness is justified
by our bin partitioning procedure, which ensures that
further subdivision of the bins would not result in sig-
nificant changes to the TWCF (the desired output of
the analysis).
3.3.2 RELAP5 Analysis Process
RELAP5/MOD3.2.2γ models the coupled behavior of
the reactor coolant system, core, and secondary side system
for loss-of-coolant accidents. RELAP5 is based on a hydro-
dynamic model for single-phase and two-phase systems
involving steam-water-noncondensible fluid mixtures in
enclosed regions. The model is non-homogeneous (the
liquid and vapor phases at the same location may flow at
different velocities) and non-equilibrium (the liquid and
vapor phases within the same region may exist at different
temperatures). The solution is based on a staggered-mesh
arrangement in which the conditions representing the fluid
state (pressures, temperatures, void fractions, etc.) are
calculated at the center of each cell and the fluid flow
behavior (liquid and vapor velocities and mass flow rates)
is calculated at the junctions between cells. The flow
through the cell regions of the flow path is subjected to
the influence of losses attributable to wall friction, and
the flow through the junctions may be subjected to the
influence of losses attributable to the presence of irregular
configurations, such as pipe bends, valves, and orifices.
In addition, the model considers the effects of friction
between the liquid and vapor phases. Flow regime maps
that provide characteristics for fluid behavior in vertical
and horizontal cell orientations determine the distribution
of steam and liquid within each cell.  
The RELAP5 heat structure model is used to represent
the structures of the physical system, such as fuel rods,
steam generator tubes, and piping walls. Heat structures
may include the effects of internal heating, such as with
fuel rods or electrically powered pressurizer heaters. Heat
structures are connected to the fluid cells and may be “single-
sided” (connecting to a fluid cell on only one side, for
example when modeling a cold leg piping wall) or “two-
sided” (connecting to fluid on both sides, for example, when
modeling the passage of heat from the primary to secondary
coolant system through the steam generator tubes).
RELAP5 calculates wall-to-fluid heat transfer on a
consistent basis, with the heat transfer based on the wall
surface temperature and the fluid conditions in the fluid
cell connected to the wall. The flow of heat within the heat
structure is based on the wall surface temperature and a
solution of the one-dimensional conduction heat transfer
equation. A wall heat transfer mode map (analogous to
the flow regime map) is used to determine the fluid-to-wall
heat transfer process based on the wall temperature and
fluid conditions (pressure, steam and liquid temperatures,
void fraction, steam and liquid velocities).
RELAP5 capabilities include trip and control functions
that allow the system model to represent the functions of
automatic and operator actions in a plant. These features
provide great flexibility for linking the hydrodynamic and
heat structure models together and using them to simulate
transients that realistically represent the behavior of plant
systems. 
3.3.3 Plant Model Development
The RELAP5 models provide detailed representations
of the plants and include all major components in both
the primary and secondary systems. The reactor vessel
nodalization includes the downcomer, lower plenum, core
inlet, core, core bypass, upper plenum, and upper head
regions. Various plant-specific design features are included
in the models. The downcomer model used in each plant
featured a two-dimensional nodalization to capture the
possible temperature variation in the downcomer resulting
from the injection of cold emergency core cooling system
(ECCS) water into each cold leg. The safety injection
systems modeled include high-pressure injection (HPI),
low-pressure injection (LPI), other ECCS components
(e.g., accumulators, core flood tanks (CFTs), and/or safety
injection tanks (SITs), depending on the plant designation),
and makeup/letdown as appropriate. The secondary coolant
system models include steam generators, main and auxiliary
/emergency feedwater, steam lines, safety valves, main
steam isolation valves (as appropriate) and turbine bypass
and stop valves. Each of the models reflected the current
plant configuration. The RELAP5 model does not include
an explicit containment model. A volume held at constant
atmospheric pressure is used to represent the containment.
It does, however, consider the increase in injection water
temperature resulting from switchover of the ECCS suction
from the refueling water storage tank (RWST) to the con-
tainment sump.  
3.3.4 Transient Event Simulations
Transient events were selected for evaluation by PRA
analysis. Since each plant possesses unique thermal-hy-
draulic, hardware failure, and operational characteristics,
there was variation in the transients events analyzed for
the three plants. The development of the transient case list
for each plant was an evolutionary process driven by the
transient or sequence definition analysis. The transient event
simulations were run as RELAP5 restart calculations begin-
ning from steady plant operating conditions. Total simulation
time was 15,000 seconds for Palisades and Beaver Valley
and 10,000 seconds for Oconee. The following general
classes of transients were simulated:
• Loss of Coolant Accidents: The entire break diameter
spectrum from 1-in. (2.54-cm) to 22.63-in. (57.47-cm)
was simulated. The breaks for most LOCA cases are
assumed to be on the hot side of the reactor coolant
system because this results in the greatest reactor coolant
system cooldown rate, an intentionally conservative
treatment. However, evaluation of cold leg breaks was
also performed.
• Reactor/Turbine Trips: The majority of cases analyzed
are initiated by a reactor/turbine trip followed by various
primary or secondary side failures. These failures include
relief valve failures, steam generator level control fail-
ures, and others. There are numerous cases where stuck-
open valves (pressurizer or steam generator PORVs,
safety relief valves, etc.) are modeled as failures follow-
ing a reactor/turbine trip. In these cases, the valve is
assumed to spuriously open at transient initiation. In a
number of cases, the valve that stuck open was assumed
to reclose at some later time. The time of reclosure
was defined as either 3,000 seconds or 6,000 seconds
depending on the transient definition from the PRA
analysis. Various times were chosen since it would
not be known when the valve would reclose (if it were
to reclose).  
• Main Steam Line Break: Main steam line break cases
were selected because they cause rapid depressurization
of the steam generator. Large breaks considered were
modeled as double-ended guillotine breaks. Smaller
steam line breaks were simulated with stuck secondary
side valves (safety relief values, automatic dump valves,
etc.).
3.3.5 Operator Actions
Various operator actions are considered. For cases
involving a primary system LOCA, the operator is assumed
to take no action since automatic systems are presumed to
operate and provide the core and primary system cooling.
In these situations, the primary operator function is to mon-
itor system conditions. For various transients involving
reactor/turbine trips combined with component failures that
lead to primary system overcooling, operator actions are
a major factor and were modeled. Both correct and improper
operator actions were considered. The most important
operator actions included in the RELAP5 models were as
follows:
• HPI control/throttling: Depending on the transient
scenario, continued HPI injection can cause the system
to refill and re-pressurize to the HPI pump shutoff
pressure and/or the pressurizer PORV opening set-point
pressure. One significant variable in the HPI control
is operator timing. Since the time that the operator
will take control of the HPI is variable depending on
the transient situation, several times are analyzed based
on PRA input to determine the variation in overall
system (downcomer) conditions.
• Reactor Coolant Pump Control: The different plants
use different criteria for tripping the RCP, so these were
modeled on a plant-specific basis. In some events, the
RCPs were not predicted to trip; however, various
operating procedures could have caused the operators
to trip the pumps. Therefore, in some cases, the RCPs
were set to trip as an operator action.
• Operator Action Failures: Failure to isolate the auxiliary
/emergency feedwater to a faulted steam generator dur-
ing a steam line break is an example of an operator fail-
ure considered in this analysis. This failure will result
in an overcooling event where the faulted generator con-
tinues to remove heat, thus lowering the primary tem-
perature. Timing of operator action was also analyzed.
3.4 Probabilistic Fracture Mechanics Analysis 
3.4.1 Model Overview
Figure 3 llustrates how the PFM model, as implemented
by the computer code Fracture Analysis of Vessels, Oak
Ridge (FAVOR) [24,25], connects to the PRA and TH
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Fig. 3. Schematic Showing the Sub-models and Information flow within that the Fracture Mechanics Model.
models. Figure 3 also shows that a number of sub-models
makeup the PFM model. In this section the fundamental
assumptions of the PFM model are described. This is
followed by summary descriptions of the major sub-models.  
3.4.2 Fundamental Assumptions
The appropriateness of the FAVOR PFM model to the
analysis of PTS rests on the validity of the following fun-
damental assumptions; there is a strong empirical/theoretical
basis for each [26].
• Linear elastic fracture mechanics (LEFM) is an appro-
priate methodology.
• The effect of crack growth by subcritical mechanisms
(i.e., environmentally assisted cracking and/or fatigue)
is negligible. 
• The cladding cannot fail due to the presence of a flaw
embedded within it as a result of the loading imposed
by PTS transients because its fracture toughness is very
high.
• Cracks located between 3/8•twall and the OD cannot ini-
tiate due to PTS because, at these locations, the applied
stresses are low (or compressive) and the fracture tough-
ness is high.  
• If the minimum temperature achieved by a transient does
not fall below 400ºF (204ºC), the transient cannot con-
tribute to the vessel failure probability because the
fracture toughness remains high at these temperatures.
3.4.3 Flaw Model
The flaw model estimates the density, size, and location
in the vessel wall of initial fabrication defects [27]. This
model represents a major improvement in realism relative
to that adopted in previous studies of PTS risk [28]; it is
based on a destructive evaluation of 27,750 cubic inches
of metal from the weld, plate, and cladding of four RPVs
(PVRUF, Shoreham, Hope Creek, and River Bend). While
sizable, this volume of material is quite small compared
with the volume of RPV material in service. Consequently,
this empirical basis does not ensure that the flaw distri-
butions developed from these data apply to PWRs in general.
To address this shortcoming, physical models and expert
opinions also informed the flaw distributions, and when
detailed information was lacking conservative judgments
were made. This combined use of empirical evidence,
physical models, expert opinions, and conservative judg-
ments allowed development of flaw distributions for use
in FAVOR that are believed to be appropriate/conservative
representations of the flaw population existing in USPWRs
in general.    
The flaw model features different flaw distributions
for buried flaws in welds, buried flaws in plates, and surface
flaws in both plates and welds, as described below.  
• Buried flaws in welds are distributed uniformly through
the thickness of the RPV weld. No surface breaking
flaws were identified in all of the weld material exam-
ined, nor was a credible physical mechanism for surface
flaw generation identified. Consequently, the weld flaw
distributions contain only buried flaws. The destructive
examinations also revealed that non-volumetric weld
flaws are virtually all lack of side-wall fusion defects.
Consequently, the number of flaws scales in proportion
to the fusion line area, and welds contain only flaws
oriented parallel to their deposition axis.
• There was less empirical evidence available to support
a distribution of buried flaws in plates, but the data
that are available agree well with the weld flaw distri-
butions after adjustment to account for the lower flaw
density in plates. The adjustment factors proposed by
a group of experts are as follows: the density of plate
flaws of depth less than 0.24-in. (6-mm) is 10% of that
for weld flaws and the density of plate flaws of depth
above 0.24-in. (6-mm) is 2.5% of that for weld flaws.
Additionally, no plate flaws of size greater than two
times the observed maximum (0.43-in. or 1.09-cm) were
simulated. Because flaws in plates did not exhibit a
preferred orientation half of the simulated plate flaws
are orientated axially, while the remaining half are
oriented circumferentially.
• Surface Flaws in Plates and Welds: The entire inner-
diameter of nuclear RPVs in the USA is clad with a
circumferentially deposited layer of stainless steel to
prevent corrosion. Lack of inter-run fusion (LOF) can
occur between adjacent weld beads, resulting in circum-
ferentially oriented cracks. The empirical data reveals
only two deep LOF defects (~50% and ~63% of the
clad layer thickness) and no defects that penetrate all the
way through the cladding. Despite the lack of empirical
evidence for through-cladding flaws, some were still
modeled in FAVOR because it is only through-clad
flaws that can challenge RPV integrity. The density
of these flaws in single-layer cladding is estimated
conservatively from empirical information on embedded
defects. If there is more than one cladding layer surface
breaking defects are viewed as incredible and, therefore,
are not modeled.    
Relative to the Marshall flaw distribution used in the
PTS studies in the 1980s [28], the new flaw distribution
contains more, but considerably smaller, flaws. Additionally,
while all of the flaws in the Marshall distribution were
surface breaking, the great majority of the flaws in this
distribution are buried. The estimated TWCF drops by a
factor of between 20 and 70 when the [27] flaw distribution
is adopted instead of the Marshall distribution [29].
3.4.4 Neutronics Model
The neutronics model is composed of two major com-
ponents: a calculation of the fluence on the inner diameter
(ID) of the vessel [30], and an attenuation of this fluence
through the wall of the vessel to the location of the crack
[31]. While the [30] procedures are technologically superior
to those used in the 1980s studies, another significant change
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to the fluence model is the much greater discretization of
the circumferential and azimuthal variation of fluence. This
refinement is a large step towards reality compared with
previous approaches where the entire ID of the vessel was
assumed to be exposed to the peak fluence. The attenuation
model [31] is the same as used in previous studies. This
model assumes that the fluence drops exponentially as the
through-wall distance from the inner diameter of the RPV
increases. In a recent review [32] concluded that, while the
RG1.99R2 attenuation model under-predicts the attenuation
of fluence through the vessel wall (i.e. it is conservative),
no better model exists at the current time.  
3.4.5 Crack Initiation Model
The crack initiation model is composed of a fracture
driving force model and a crack initiation resistance model.
The probability of a crack initiating is determined by com-
paring the fracture driving force (Kapplied) and the crack
initiation resistance (KIc). The following subsections, we
discuss the features of these models.
3.4.5.1 Fracture Driving Force Model
Warm Pre-Stress (WPS) effects were first noted in [33],
who reported that the apparent fracture toughness of a
ferritic steel can be elevated in the fracture mode transition
regime if the specimen is first “pre-stressed” at an elevated
temperature. The physical mechanisms responsible for WPS
have been identified, studied extensively, and validated.
Depending upon the specifics of the transient WPS may
be effective, thereby preventing initiation of a cleavage
crack even though Kapplied exceeds KIc. To incorporate WPS,
FAVOR’s fracture driving force model is as follows (all
three conditions must be satisfied for there to be a non-
zero probability of crack initiation, or CPI): 
Adopting a WPS model reduces the TWCF estimated
for certain, but not all, transients. For example, the TWCF
estimated for a primary side pipe break will be significantly
smaller when the effects of WPS are considered because
the value of Kapplied falls steadily with increasing time after
the peak. Conversely, the TWCF of a stuck-open valve that
recloses later during the transient (thereby re-pressurizing
the primary system) may not be affected by WPS at all.
In a full PTS analysis of Oconee Unit 1 inclusion of WPS
reduces the estimated TWCF by between a factor of 2
and 3 [26].  
As noted in Eq. 1-2, FAVOR adopts a value α=1. A
recent comprehensive study of WPS conducted as part of
a the European Commission sponsored project SMILE
showed that α is usually, but not always, greater than 1 [34].
When the distribution of α values reported in [34] are coded
into FAVOR the estimated TWCF is actually lower than
that predicted using Eq. 2, indicating that the FAVOR
WPS model is conservative [35].  
3.4.5.2 Crack Initiation Resistance Model
Our model includes the following five characteristics,
all having functional forms motivated by an understanding
of the physical processes responsible for cleavage fracture
and numerical coefficients fit to empirical data:
• A model of cleavage crack initiation fracture tough-
ness that features a temperature dependence and scatter
that is universal to all ferritic steels and is uninfluenced
by irradiation, and a finite lower bound to the distribution
of crack initiation toughness values (i.e., a value of
fracture driving force below which cleavage fracture
cannot occur). Our physical understanding of cleavage
fracture suggests that the uncertainty (scatter) in fracture
toughness should be modeled as aleatory. Because of
this, in any individual probabilistic realization, FAVOR
represents KIc as a distribution, not as a single value
sampled from a distribution.
• A model to account for the implicit conservatism
in RTNDT: Our model recognizes that RTNDT is a conser-
vative approximation to the true fracture toughness
transition temperature, and so removes this conserva-
tive bias (on average). This bias is modeled as an epis-
temic uncertainty. 
• An irradiation damage model that recognizes that the
effects of irradiation are purely athermal (i.e., affecting
only the position of the fracture toughness transition
curve on the temperature axis). This model, is a physi-
cally motivated fit to data from the United States Light
Water Reactor (USLWR) surveillance program.  
• A model to convert between Charpy shift and frac-
ture toughness shift due to irradiation: Recognizing
that the shift in fracture toughness is not necessarily
the same as the shift in Charpy V-notch energy quan-
tified by the irradiation damage model, FAVOR incor-
porates a linear conversion between Charpy and fracture
toughness shift [36].  
• Consideration of systematic material property varia-
tions throughout the beltline region: The specific
properties (composition, unirradiated fracture toughness)
of each weld, plate, and forging in the beltline are
modeled explicitly in FAVOR, along with uncertainties
in these variables. This refinement greatly exceeds
that of previous PTS studies, where the entire beltline
was modeled as having the fracture toughness of the
most limiting component. Epistemic uncertainties in
the properties of each beltline region are accounted
for and propagated through the FAVOR calculation.    
3.4.6 Through-Wall Cracking Model
Provided that CPI > 0, FAVOR checks to see how far
the simulated crack will propagate into the vessel wall. The
through-wall cracking model is itself composed of a fracture
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(Eq. 2)
driving force model (which again is based on linear elastic
fracture mechanics) and a crack growth resistance model
(which is composed of a cleavage crack arrest model, an
upper shelf ductile tearing model, models that link cleavage
crack initiation properties to both cleavage crack arrest
properties and to ductile crack initiation properties, and a
through-thickness property gradient model). The probability
of through-wall cracking is determined by comparing Kapplied
to the cleavage crack arrest toughness (KIa). If a propagating
crack arrests the potential for re-initiation at some later
time in the transient is assessed relative to the material’s
resistance to crack initiation in either cleavage (KIc) or by
ductile tearing (K{JIc}, and the associated J-R curve). A
check for overload of the un-cracked portion of the vessel
wall is also performed. Key features of the through-wall
propagation model are as follows:  
• The crack arrest toughness model features a tem-
perature dependence and an aleatory scatter of crack
arrest toughness universal to all ferritic steels and not
influenced by irradiation. Additionally, the crack arrest
transition index temperature is related to the index tem-
perature of the crack initiation toughness transition curve.
• The upper shelf ductile initiation and tearing model
features a temperature dependence and an aleatory
scatter of upper shelf toughness universal to all ferritic
steels and not influenced by irradiation. Additionally,
there is a systematic relationship between the tempera-
ture at which the cleavage and ductile crack initiation
toughness curves cross and index temperature of the
crack initiation toughness transition curve [37].
3.5 Uncertainty Treatment and Propagation
Our approach considers a broad range of factors that
influence the likelihood of vessel failure during a PTS
event, while accounting for uncertainties in these factors
across a breadth of technical disciplines [38]. Two central
features of this approach are a focus on the use of realistic
input values and models (wherever possible), and explicit
treatment of uncertainties (using currently available uncer-
tainty analysis tools and techniques). Thus, our current
approach improves upon that employed in developing
SECY-82-465, in which many aspects of the analysis inclu-
ded intentional and un-quantified conservatisms, and uncer-
tainties were treated implicitly by incorporating them into
the models (RTNDT, for example).  
Our probabilistic models distinguish between aleatory
and epistemic uncertainties. Aleatory uncertainties arise as
a result of the randomness inherent in a physical or human
process, whereas epistemic uncertainties are caused by
limitations in our current state of knowledge (or under-
standing) of a given process. A practical way to distinguish
between aleatory and epistemic uncertainties is that the
latter can, in principle, be reduced by an increased state of
knowledge. Conversely, because aleatory uncertainties arise
as a result of randomness at a level below which a particular
process is modeled, they are fundamentally irreducible.
The distinction between aleatory and epistemic uncertainties
is an important part of PTS analysis because different math-
ematical and/or modeling procedures are used to represent
these different types of uncertainty.
While uncertainties in all parts of the PTS model have
been systematically examined, not all have been numerically
quantified as part of the model. Nevertheless, these un-
quantified uncertaintinties have still been accounted for
in the model structure (e.g., via conservative binning of
transients, by adoption of conservative models, etc.). Table 3
summarizes the uncertainty treatment for the three major
parts of the PTS model.  
4. RESULTS OF CALCULATIONS 
Fig. 4 and Fig. 5 summarize the key results from [4]. In
Fig. 4 the 95th percentile of the TWCF distribution (TWCF95)†
for different transient classes is plotted as a function of
embrittlement, while Fig. 5 presents the variation of TWCF95
for different flaw populations with embrittlement. The
following variables were used to quantify embrittlement;
they appear on the abscissas of Fig. 4 and Fig. 5:
RTMAX-AW characterizes the resistance of the RPV to
fracture initiating from flaws found along the
axial weld fusion lines. Because these flaws
sample both the toughness properties of the
weld and of the adjacent plate, the value of
RTMAX-AW is the higher of the RT for the weld
and the plate. The value of RTMAX-AW for the
vessel is the highest RTMAX-AW of any individ-
ual axial weld fusion line.  
RTMAX-PL characterizes the resistance of the RPV to
fracture initiating from flaws in plates that
are not associated with welds. The value of
RTMAX-PL for the vessel is the highest RTMAX-PL
of any individual plate  
RTMAX-CW characterizes the resistance of the RPV to
fracture initiating from flaws found along the
circumferential weld fusion lines. Because
these flaws sample both the toughness prop-
erties of the weld and of the adjacent plate
(or forging), the value of RTMAX-CW is the
higher of the RT for the weld and the plate
(or forging). The value of RTMAX-CW for the
vessel is the highest RTMAX-CW of any indi-
vidual circumferential weld fusion line.    
Implications of the results in Fig. 4 and Fig. 5 are dis-
cussed in the following two sub-sections.
286 NUCLEAR ENGINEERING AND TECHNOLOGY,  VOL.45  NO.3  JUNE 2013
MARK KIRK Development of the Alternate Pressurized Thermal Shock Rule (10 CFR 50.61a) in the United States
† Because of the skewness in the distribution of TWCF values,
the mean of these distributions corresponds to a very high
percentile value (above the 80th percentile for all embrittlement
levels studied). TWCF95 was adopted to provide a consistent
basis for comparison between all analyses.
4.1 Dominant Transients
Our analysis assessed the contribution of a wide variety
of transient classes to PTS risk, including primary-side
pipe breaks, stuck-open valves on the primary side, main
steamline breaks, stuck-open valves on the secondary side,
feed-and-bleed, steam generator tube rupture, and mixed
primary and secondary initiators. Only the most severe
transients make any significant contribution to the total
TWCF. Fig. 4 shows the dependence on embrittlement of
the TWCF95 caused by the dominant transient classes, while
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Fig. 4. TWCF Fractions for the Three Study Plants Attributable to Different Broad Classes of Transients [4]. 
Fig. 5. TWCF Fractions for the Three Study Plants Attributable to Different Flaw Populations [4].
Table 3. Summary of Uncertainty Treatment in the Three Major Technical Areas
Uncertainty Type
Aleatory
Epistemic
Aleatory
Epistemic
Aleatory
Epistemic
Uncertainties that were accounted for in the
structure of the model
Discretization of all of the ways a PTS challenge
could occur into a finite number of “bins”
Boundary condition uncertainties
Model uncertainties
Adoption of conservative models (e.g., RTNDT,
flaw distribution, fluence attenuation)
---
---
Uncertainties that were  numerically quantified
Bin frequency
The effects of certain boundary condition
uncertainties are reflected in the frequencies
assigned to certain PRA bins.
Uncertainties in fracture toughness values (e.g.,
KIc, KIa, JIc)
Uncertainties in non-toughness values (e.g., Cu, Ni)
Technical
Area
PRA
TH
PFM
Fig. 6 shows the percentage of the total TWCF contributed
by each transient class (transients not represented in these
figures contribute less than 0.1% to the TWCF). The follow-
ing paragraphs explore why some transients contribute to
TWCF while others do not.
The most significant transient class is faults on the
primary side, which collectively are responsible for 90%
or more of the total TWCF. These faults fall into two sub-
categories: stuck open valves that may later re-close, and
medium- to large-diameter pipe breaks. At low embrit-
tlement levels (RTMAX-AW<≈220 ºF) stuck open valves that
may later re-close dominate the TWCF. While the initial
cooling rate of these transients is modest, they cool the
primary system to temperatures on the order of the injection
water (50ºF). At this low temperature re-pressurization
may occur if operators do not realize that the valve has
re-closed and throttle injection. Even though the fracture
toughness is relatively high at these lower embrittlement
levels, the stresses generated by re-pressurization can fail
the vessel. At higher embrittlement levels medium- to large-
diameter pipe breaks dominate the TWCF. The rapid cooling
rates and low downcomer temperatures generated by rapid
depressurization and emergency injection of low-temper-
ature makeup water combine to produce a high-severity
transient.  
Breaks of the main steam line (MSLB) are a small (<
10%) contributor. While MSLBs rapidly cool the inventory
of the primary pressure circuit, they do not produce low
temperatures in the primary system, which is limited to the
boiling point of water in the secondary system. At this
temperature, the RPV steel is sufficiently tough to resist
failure most of the time. 
Together these three transient classes make up nearly
all of the TWCF; they exhibit remarkably little plant-to-plant
variation in the US PWR fleet for the following reasons:
Stuck-open valves that may later re-close: When these
transients cause failure they do so at the time of re-
pressurization when the primary coolant temperature
is invariably at, or near, that of the injection water. At
re-pressurization the pressure goes to the safety valve
setpoint. These factors are similar across the operating
fleet in the United States. While operator actions influ-
ence the characteristics of these transients early on, at
the time failure is predicted the effect of operator action
is negligible
Medium to large diameter pipe breaks: Once the size
of the pipe break exceeds 6- to 8-in. in diameter the
temperature of the primary coolant water is falling so
rapidly that the temperature of the steel in the RPV wall
cannot keep up due to its finite thermal conductivity.
The cooling rate of the vessel wall, and thus the thermal
stress, is therefore controlled by two factors: the thermal
conductivity of the steel, and the thickness of the vessel
wall. The similarity of PWR diameters in the US fleet
leads to a roughly equivalent challenge being posed
to all RPVs by this transient class. Operator action is
not a factor as the only possible operator action is to
maximize the injection of water so as to keep the core
covered.  
Main Steam Line Breaks: If a RPV failure is predicted
as a result of a MSLB it will be predicted very early
in the transient, long before any operator action could
credibly occur. At these times the transient charac-
teristics are dominated by the extremely fast initial
cooling rates, which are similar across the RPV fleet
due to the fact that the cooling rate of the RPV inventory
is far faster than can be achieved in the wall of the RPV,
so plant-specific differences in steam-line diameter
cannot influence the TWCF.  
4.2 Dominant Material Features
Fig. 5 shows the relationship between three RT metrics,
RTMAX-AW, RTMAX-PL, and RTMAX-CW, and the TWCF95 resulting
from three flaw populations: axial fusion line flaws in
axial welds, axial and circumferential flaws in plates, and
circumferential flaws in circumferential welds (respectively).
Fig. 7 places all three curve-fits from Fig. 5 on a single
graph, which makes clear that axial weld flaws dominate
the TWCF. These significantly different TWCFs arising
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Fig. 7. An Overlay of the Curve Fits from Fig. 5  Showing
How, at Equivalent Embrittlement Levels, the TWCF
Produced by Axial Weld Flaws Far Exceeds that Produced by
Either Flaws in Plates, or by Flaws in Circumferential Welds.
Fig. 6. An Overlay of the Curve Fits from Fig. 4 Showing
How the Dominant Transient Class Varies with Embrittlement
Level (as Measured by the Maximum Reference Temperature).
from different flaw populations can be understood based
on three factors that are all summarized in Table 4: flaw
size, the number of flaws in the vessel, and flaw orientation.
The relative effects of flaw size and orientation are easily
understood (bigger flaws are worse, more flaws are worse);
Table 4 details differences in flaw sizes and numbers for
the different flaw populations modeled. The effect of flaw
orientation (axial or circumferential) is critically important
because of its effect on the likelihood of crack arrest.
Cheverton et al. describe how the application of a cold
thermal shock to the inner diameter of a cylinder containing
a flaw produces bending of the cylinder wall [39]. This
bending, originating from the contraction of the cold metal
at and near the ID and the resistance to this contraction
provided by the hotter metal at the OD, tends to be much
larger for axial flaws (an asymmetric geometry) than for
circumferential flaws (a symmetric geometry). The asym-
metry associated with the axial flaw degrades the cylinder's
resistance to bending, which produces an applied-KI that
continues to increase with increasing crack depth. Thus once
an axial crack initiates, arrest, while possible, is difficult.
Conversely, for circumferentially oriented cracks the applied-
KI peaks about one-third of the way through the vessel wall.
This driving force peak provides a natural crack arrest
mechanism that limits the TWCF due to circumferential
flaws to very low values. The integrated effects of flaw size,
the number of flaws in the vessel, and flaw orientation
combine to suggest that the characteristics of the material
properties that can be associated with axial weld flaws (i.e.,
axial weld and plate properties) dominate the predicted
TWCF, while the material properties of the circumferential
welds have little influence on the TWCF.  
4.3 Generalization Studies
To assess the applicability of these findings to US
PWRs in general, a number of “generalization studies”
were performed. These studies revealed the following:
TH Sensitivity Studies: No credible effects were discov-
ered that changed the results significantly enough to
recommend changes to the baseline RELAP model,
or to recommend cautions regarding the robustness of
those models.
PFM Sensitivity Studies: No credible effects were dis-
covered that changed the results significantly enough
to recommend changes to the baseline FAVOR model.
However, these studies revealed that the baseline studies
did not address the effects of vessel wall thickness ade-
quately, nor did they provide the basis for establishing
RT-limits for ring-forged vessels. Further work on both
topics appears in Section 5.
Design and Operational Characteristics of other PWRs:
With the exception of stuck-open valves at low levels
of embrittlement a study of five additional PWRs re-
vealed no differences in sequence progression, sequence
frequency, or plant thermal-hydraulic response signifi-
cant enough to call into question the applicability of
the TWCF results from the three detailed plant analyses
to PWRs in general. A minor inadequacy of the three
detailed plant analyses to entirely treat stuck-open
values was addressed by introduction of the α-factor
(see Section 5).
External Events: An investigation of external initiating
events (e.g., fires, earthquakes, floods) showed the
contribution of those events to the total TWCF is
negligible.
5. USE OF THESE FINDINGS TO ESTABLISH
REGULATORY LIMITS 
The information presented in Section 4 demonstrates
that the three study plants represent the population of
PWRs operating in the USA well subject to the following
restrictions:
The results for the study plants underestimate slightly
the TWCF from stuck-open valves on the primary side
that may later reclose at low embrittlement levels, 
The results for the study plants do not capture the
effect of RPV thickness on TWCF, and
The study plants do not represent the effects of forging
flaws.
In view of these restrictions provisional regulatory
limits were first developed based only on the results from
the three study plants. These provisional limits were then
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Table 4. Effect of Flaw Population on TWCF
Flaw Size
Larger
TWCF
Number of Flaws
Higher density limited weld length =
fewer flaws TWCF
Flaw Orientation & Effect on Arrest
Probability
Axial – low arrest probability
TWCF
Composite Effect
on TWCF
Dominant effect
Flaw Population
in Axial Welds
Larger
TWCF
Higher density limited weld length =
fewer flaws TWCF
Circumferential – high arrest
probability TWCF
Negligible effect
in Circumferential
Welds
Smaller
TWCF
Lower density very large area = more
flaws TWCF
50% axial, 50% circumferential
TWCF of Axial flaws TWCF of
Circumferential flaws
Small effectin Plates
modified, based on the results of sensitivity studies, to
remove these restrictions. The remaining information in
this section describes this process.
The fits to the TWCF95-xx versus RTMAX-xx relationships
shown in Fig. 5 can be added together to develop a rela-
tionship that estimates the total TWCF95 that can be expect-
ed for a plate welded RPV based on the level of embrittl-
ement experienced by its constituent parts. Fig. 8 provides
a graphical depiction of this relationship. The 3D surface
in the figure represents the combinations of RTMAX-AW,
RTMAX-PL, and RTMAX-CW that produce a total TWCF95=
1x10-6/ry. This figure provides a tool by which operating
plate welded RPVs can be assessed. By plotting the em-
brittlement characteristics of each RPV (as quantified by
RTMAX-AW, RTMAX-PL, and RTMAX-CW) in the 3D space of Fig. 8
one can quickly determine if a particular RPV is predicted
to have a TWCF95 below 1x10-6/ry (i.e. points plotting inside
the surface) or above 1x10-6/ry (i.e. points plotting outside
the surface). Fig. 9 provides such a plot for all currently
operating plate-welded PWRs in the USA for purposes of
illustration (in this plot, the negligible effects of circum-
ferential weld flaws have been ignored for clarity; this
simplification permits representation of the 3D surface in
Fig.8 in 2D).
As stated previously, the provisional limits shown in
Fig. 5 require modification to address all conditions of
interest for PWRs operating in the USA. These modifica-
tions, which are based on sensitivity studies described in
[ 40], are as follows:
• Stuck Open Valves: When the results from the three
study plants were compared to a larger population of
RPVs in the generalization study it was determined
that the TWCF produced by stuck open valves that
may later re-close is under-estimated by up to a factor
of 2.5 for plants that have a much smaller RCS volume
than did the study plants. To address this deficiency a
factor (α) was introduced in the derivation of the final
limits. The α factor is a 2.5 multiplier at low embrittle-
ment levels that diminishes to 1 at high embrittlement
levels because, as shown in Fig. 6, the influence of
stuck open valves on the total TWCF diminishes as
embrittlement increases.
• Vessel Wall Thickness: The wall thickness of all three
study plants is 8 to 8 -in., which is characteristic of
the vast majority of PWRs in the USA. However, three
PWRs are thicker (11-11 -in.) while seven are thinner
(6 -7-in.). The magnitude of the stresses produced
by thermal shock increase with wall thickness because
thicker vessels are stiffer. Sensitivity studies performed
to investigate this effect found that, with all other factors
held constant, the TWCF could increase by between
8x and 40x (depending on the transient) as vessel wall
thickness is increases between 8 and 11 inches. To
address this deficiency a factor (β) was introduced in
the derivation of the final limits. The β multiplier
increases the TWCF by a factor of 8 for each inch of
thickness by which the vessel exceeds 9 -in. (TWCF
is not reduced for thinner vessels, which is conservative).  
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Fig. 9. Maximum RT-based Screening Criterion (1E-6 Curve) for Plate-welded Vessels (Left: Screening Criterion Relative to
Currently Operating PWRs after 40 years of Operation; Right: Screening Criterion Relative to Currently Operating PWRs after 60
years of Operation [4].
Fig. 8. Graphical Representation of the Curve Fits in 
Fig. 6. The TWCF of the Surface shown is 1x10-6, so Inside
the Surface (Toward the Origin) the TWCF Less, while
Outside the Surface the TWCF Exceeds 1x10-6 [4].
• Forging Flaws, Embedded: Forgings have a population
of embedded flaws that is particular in density and size
to their method of manufacture. The sensitivity studies
in [4] revealed that embedded flaws in forgings are
similar in both size and density to the embedded flaws
in plates modeled in the three study plants. Consequently
the relationship between RTMAX-PL and TWCF95 (see
center graph, Fig. 5) was adopted to characterize em-
bedded flaws in forgings.  
• Underclad Cracks in Forgings: Forgings may contain
underclad cracks that are produced by the deposition
of the austenitic stainless steel cladding layer. Underclad
cracks occur as dense arrays of shallow cracks extending
into the vessel wall from the clad-to-base metal interface
to depths that are limited by the extent of the heat-
affected zone. These cracks are oriented normal to the
direction of welding for clad deposition, producing
axially oriented cracks in the vessel beltline. Available
information from the literature was used to establish
a flaw distribution for underclad cracks, which was used
as input to FAVOR. Fig. 10 summarizes the results of
these analyses. The rate of increase of TWCF with
increasing embrittlement for underclad cracks is much
more rapid than shown previously (see Fig. 4) for plate
and weld flaws. The steepness of this slope occurs
because of the very high density of underclad cracks
assumed in the analysis (the mean crack-to-crack spac-
ing is on the order of millimeters), which means it is
a virtual certainty that an underclad crack will occur
in locations of high embrittlement. The data in Fig. 10
was used, together with that from Fig. 5, to establish
the final PTS screening limits for forgings.
Collectively, the information presented in the preceding
paragraphs provides the basis to augment the provisional
procedure expressed in Fig.8 and Fig. 9, thereby enabling
the development of a general equation that can be used to
estimate the TWCF95 for any operating PWR in the USA
based only on input information regarding material embrit-
tlement. This procedure can be expressed in two equivalent
ways: either in terms of a limit placed on TWCF (see Eq.
1-3), or in terms of a limit placed on the various reference
temperature (RT) metrics (see Table 5).
where
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(Eq. 3)
Table 5. RT Limits for PWRs to Ensure that TWCF95 Remains Below 10-6/ry
RT Value 
Limit on RT value for different values of TWALL [ºF]
≤9.5 in. >9.5 in., ≤10.5 in. >10.5 in., ≤11.5 in.
RTMAX-AW
RTMAX-PL
RTMAX-AW + RTMAX-PL
RTMAX-CW (see note below)
RTMAX-FO
For RPVs complying with RG 1.43
For RPVs not complying with RG 1.43
269
356
538
312
356
246
Note: The limit on RTMAX-CW corresponds to a TWCF95 value of 10-8/ry.  Should these limits on RTMAX-CW be exceeded, the RTMAX-AW,
RTMAX-PL, RTMAX-FO, and RTMAX CW values should be used, along with Eq. 1-3, to estimate the total TWCF95 value. This total
TWCF95 is limited to 1x10-6.  
230
305
476
277
305
241
222
293
445
269
293
239
Fig. 10. Relationship between TWCF and RT for Forgings
Having Underclad Flaws [4]
and the factors α, β, η are defined as follows: 6. RULES FOR ASSESSMENT OF PLANTS
RELATIVE TO REGULATORY LIMITS 
As of the publication date of this document, the follow-
ing two rules in the United States Code of Federal Regula-
tions (CFR) pertain to PTS:
10 CFR 50.61: The mandatory rule [2]
10 CFR 50.61a:The voluntary alternate rule [7]
The mandatory rule has been in force since 1984, its
technical basis is detailed in [1]. The technical basis for
the voluntary alternative rule was summarized in this Paper
and is described in detail in [3,4,26,40]. Table 6 compares
the provisions of the two rules. A major difference is that
the RT-limits of the alternate rule are more detailed, and
permit higher embrittlement levels to occur. These higher
permitted embrittlement levels are justified by the increased
accuracy of the modeling, data, and physical understanding
that provides the technical basis for the alternative rule.
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Table 6. Comparison of the Requirements and Procedures of 10 CFR 50.61 and 10 CFR 50.61a.
10 CFR 50.61
(Mandatory Rule)
10 CFR 50.61a
(Voluntary Alternate Rule)
Topic
To any operating reactor in the USA
Unirradiated RTNDT and the shift in the 30 ft-lb Charpy index temperature due to
irradiation
Only to reactors in the USA whose original
operating license was issued prior to
January 4, 2010.  Applicability to other
reactors must be demonstrated by the
licensee.
Applicability
Depends on Cu, Ni, fluence, and product
form.
Depends on Cu, Ni, P, Mn, flux, fluence,
vessel manufacturer, weld flux type, and
product form.
Embrittlement trend curve (ETC) for
Charpy shift
Yes.  Depends on if unirradiated RTNDT is
measured or generic, and if credible
surveillance data is available.
NoIs margin applied to the on generic ETC?
One.  The material having the highest
RTNDT (adjusted for embrittlement effects
and uncertainties) is identified as the
"limiting material").
Two or Three. Different RT metrics are
estimated for each of the following: all
axial welds, all plates, all circumferential
welds, and all forgings. [41]
Reference temperature metrics
300 ºF for circumferential welds, 270 ºF
for everything else.
Yes
Prescriptive. One type of check is
performed.
Prescriptive.  If surveillance data are
credible they must be used to adjust the
generic estimate of Charpy shift.
None
See Table 1.5
Prescriptive. Three types of checks are
performed.
Left to the discretion of the licensee
Mandatory.  Must demonstrate that flaws
are fewer and smaller than limits prescribed
in the rule.
Reference temperature limits
Inspection requirement for the RPV beltline
Check to see if data is
well modeled by ETC?
Procedure to perform
check
Procedure to modify
generic ETC of data
fails the check
Treatment of
plant-specific
surveillance data
Toughness Metrics
EquationConditionFactor
RTMAX-xx ≤ 625RStuck-
Open
Valves
α
Vessel
Thickness
β
Sub-Clad
Cracks
η
αxx = 2.5
αxx = 1
β= 1
β = 1+ 8·(TWALL - 9 )
β = 17
η = 0
η = 1
625R < RTMAX-xx <
875R
RTMAX-xx ≥ 875R
TWALL ≤ 9 -in
9 < TWALL < 11 -in
TWALL ≥ 11 -in
Forging is compliant
with Regulatory
Guide 1.43
Forging not com-
pliant with Regula-
tory Guide 1.43
αxx = 2.5 – 1.5250 (RTMAX-xx – 625)
However, a significant entry condition must be met to use
the alternate rule: a vessel inspection must be performed so
that the flaws that may exist in the vessel may be compared
to the flaws that were assumed in the derivation of the RT-
limits of the voluntary alternative rule.
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